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Abstract 
 
The external balance sheets of many emerging market countries are distinguished by their 
holdings of assets primarily in the form of foreign debt and foreign exchange reserves, while 
their liabilities are predominantly equity, either FDI or portfolio. In this paper we investigate the 
claim that this composition served as a buffer for the emerging markets during the global 
financial crisis of 2008-09. We use data from a sample of 67 emerging market and advanced 
economies, and several indicators of the crisis are utilized: GDP growth rates in 2008-09, the 
occurrence of bank crises and the use of IMF credit. Our results show that those countries that 
issued FDI liabilities had higher growth rates, fewer bank crises and were less likely to borrow 
from the IMF. Countries with debt liabilities, on the other hand, had more bank crises and were 
more likely to use IMF credit. We conclude that the “long debt, short equity” strategy of 
emerging markets did mitigate the effects of the global financial crisis. 
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External Balance Sheets as 
Countercyclical Crisis Buffers 
 
1. Introduction 
 While the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-09 was truly an international 
phenomenon, some countries were more severely affected than other. The decline was steepest in 
the high-income countries, where GDP contracted in 2009 by 3.5%. The emerging market and 
developing economies also recorded declines in growth rates, but the differences between their 
rates and those of the advanced economies rose during the crisis (see Figure 1). The relatively 
stronger performance of the emerging markets and developing economies has been attributed to 
several factors, including improved macroeconomic policies, stronger external positions before 
the crisis, more regulated financial sectors and a rapid response by the IMF.1 In this paper we 
investigate whether the composition of the external balance sheets of emerging market nations 
also mitigated the effects of the global downturn on their economies. 
 After the financial crises that occurred in emerging markets during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, many of these nations altered the compositions of their external balance sheets. 
Countries that once had borrowed external funds primarily through debt in the form of bonds or 
bank loans turned to equity, either foreign direct investment (FDI) or portfolio equity, for sources 
of finance. As a result, their equity liabilities grew steadily, both in terms of magnitude and 
relative to their debt liabilities. Their assets, on the other hand, have largely consisted of the 
foreign exchange reserves of their central banks, held in the form of U.S. Treasury bonds, and 
other debt holdings. This profile is known as “long debt, short equity,” and differs from the “long 
equity, short debt” composition of most advanced economies that hold equity and issue debt.  
 Lane (2013) has claimed that the structure of the emerging markets’ external balance 
sheets served as a buffer against the GFC, while the contrasting profile of many advanced 
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economies’ assets and liabilities heightened their vulnerability. Similarly, Gourinchas, Rey and 
Govillot (2010) have maintained that the U.S. provided “insurance” to other countries against the 
effect of the crisis through its holdings of their equities. The fall in equity valuations combined 
with depreciations against the dollar lowered the value of the liabilities of the emerging market 
nations while the value of their foreign-currency denominated assets increased, thus raising their 
net international investment positions (NIIP). Similarly, the payments on their equity liabilities 
fell, while the earnings they received on their holdings of debt largely continued to be paid, 
which improved their net investment income balance. The advanced economies that were net 
holders of equity, on the other hand, suffered deteriorations in their external positions and net 
income balances. They were also subject to capital flight and financial volatility, which was 
much less of a threat for the emerging markets that had issued FDI. 
This paper tests whether the composition of external assets and liabilities affected the 
impact of the GFC on emerging markets and advanced economies. We specifically look at the 
net holdings and gross stocks of equity and debt assets and liabilities. We investigate their effect 
on GDP growth rates during the crisis, the incidence of bank crises and participation in IMF 
programs. While other papers have explored the causes and extent of the GFC (see literature 
review below), ours concentrates on how the external holdings of equity and debt affected the 
response of countries to the GFC.  
To preview our results, we find that countries with FDI liabilities recorded smaller 
declines in GDP growth, experienced fewer bank crises and were less likely to enter IMF 
programs. Holdings of FDI assets were associated with lower growth rates. Portfolio assets and 
liabilities had similar impacts but their coefficients are less significant. External debt liabilities, 
on the other hand, were associated with a greater incidence of bank crises and more use of IMF 
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credit. Our results, therefore, demonstrate that the “long debt, short equity” strategy of many 
emerging markets did act as a countercyclical stabilizer to mitigate the effects of the global 
financial crisis. FDI liabilities in particular serve as a risk-sharing mechanism, which can provide 
the basis of a “pecking order” of international capital flows. 
The next section assesses the impact of balance sheet positions on the transmission of 
external shocks. The following section presents a selective review of the relevant literature. 
Section 4 describes the empirical model and data. Section 5 contains our main results for the 
investigation of a linkage between the severity of the crisis and the composition of the external 
balance sheet. In section 6 we examine the robustness of our results. Section 7 offers a pecking 
order for the different forms of capital flows based on our results, which we compare with other 
rankings that have been advanced. The last section offers our conclusions and proposes 
extensions of the research. 
 
2. Balance Sheets and the Transmission of External Shocks 
Figure 2 provides a stylized version of a country’s external balance sheet, which records 
the foreign assets owned by domestic residents and the domestic liabilities owned by foreigners. 
The net position determines a country’s NIIP as a creditor or debtor. The foreign assets are 
denominated in the foreign currencies, while domestic equity is denominated in the domestic 
currency. Domestic debt held outside a country may be denominated in the domestic or a foreign 
currency.2  
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2007) in a series of seminal papers provided data and 
analysis on the external assets and liabilities of a wide range of countries. They pointed out that 
international financial integration had advanced much further in the advanced economies than in 
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the emerging markets. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and Kose and Prasad (2010) also noted 
the increase over time by emerging market countries in the use of equity liabilities. The advanced 
economies that hold these liabilities have themselves issued debt liabilities, which in turn are 
held by the emerging markets. In the empirical literature, Faria et al. (2007), Faria and Mauro 
(2009) and Vermeulen and de Haan (2014) attribute the rise in the issuance of equity liabilities 
by emerging markets to improvements in institutional quality and/or financial development in 
these countries.3 
The external balance sheet can affect a country’s performance during a crisis through 
several transmission mechanisms. The first is a wealth effect exerted through a country’s NIIP. 
Gourinchas and Rey (2007a, 2007b, 2014), who examined the role of external balance sheets in 
preserving the intertemporal budget constraint, focused on the role of valuation changes, which 
are driven by fluctuations in the market values of assets and liabilities as well as exchange rate 
movements. A decline in the value of equity, for example, will lower the NIIP of those nations 
that are “long” equity, while raising it for those that are “short” equity. A depreciation of the 
exchange rate has mixed effects: on the one hand, it increases the value of a country’s foreign 
assets while lowering the value of liabilities denominated in the domestic currency. But it also 
raises the value of any foreign-held debt that is denominated in a foreign currency. 
These changes in the NIIPs can exert wealth effects on expenditures. Kubelec, Orskaug 
and Tanaka (2007) analyzed the external balance sheets of the United Kingdom, the U.S. and 
Canada, and described how changes in these would impact economic activity within the 
countries. Cavallo et al. (2005), using data from 24 crises in the 1990s, reported that balance 
sheet effects due to exchange rate overshooting led to large contractions in output.4  
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The second channel of transmission between the composition of the balance sheet and 
economic performance takes place through the flow of net investment income. Dividend 
payments on equity investment are state-contingent, while debt payments are contractual in 
nature. Consequently, in normal times equity payments incorporate an equity “premium,” and 
equity payments exceed those on debt. But during a crisis, the equity payments are cut as profits 
fall, while debt payments continue, except in the extreme case of a default. Net income payments 
for China, for example, are usually negative despite the country’s NIIP status as a creditor 
because the payments made on foreign-held FDI exceeds the interest received on U.S. Treasury 
and other securities. Ma and McCauley (2014) pointed out, however, that in 2008 China’s net 
income payments turned positive due to the reduction in income outflows while the country 
continued to receive a return, albeit a small one, on its holdings of U.S. Treasury debt. Lane 
(2001), Balli, Basher and Balli (2011) and Bracke and Schmitz (2011) examined whether 
investment income flows and capital gains can smooth income.5 
Third, the structure of the external balance sheet influences the degree of volatility in 
financial flows before and during crises. Changes in the stocks of assets and liabilities initiated 
by foreign and/or domestic investors can overwhelm financial markets and institutions, and 
exacerbate a crisis. In the case of a “sudden stop,” there is a severe drop in capital inflows and 
the reversal of a current account deficit, which is often accompanied by a recession.  
The degree of instability manifested by financial assets and liabilities depends in part on 
their composition. Several studies have compared the relative stability of equity and debt flows 
during crises. Levchenko and Mauro (2007), for example, found that FDI flows were stable 
during periods of sudden stops, while portfolio equity played a limited role in the proliferation of 
these crises. Portfolio debt, on the other hand, and bank flows were more likely to be reversed. 
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Similarly, Sula and Willett (2009) investigated the behavior of capital flows during currency 
crises, and reported that FDI was the most stable, while loans were as likely to be reversible as 
portfolio flows. 
The transmission of external shocks to an economy will be intermediated through a 
country’s external balance sheet. Whether or not the shock is amplified or attenuated depends on 
both the size and configuration of the components of the balance sheet. The difference in the 
compositions of assets and liabilities between emerging market and advanced economies makes 
the GFC a suitable focus to study these effects. 
 
3. Literature Review 
The role of external assets and liabilities in propagating financial crises has been 
extensively studied. The debt crisis of the 1980s, for example, was due in part to the bank debt 
that developing economies had accumulated in the previous decade. Rodrik and Velasco (2000) 
showed that short-term bank debt contributed to the occurrence of capital flow crises during the 
period of 1988-98.  
Pistelli, Selaive and Valdés (2008) investigated how the composition of external assets 
and liabilities affected the occurrence of current account reversals, sudden stops and currency 
crises. Portfolio equity liabilities were associated with a higher occurrence of current account 
reversals, while FDI liabilities had the opposite effect. They also found that FDI assets made 
sudden stops more likely, but portfolio equity assets and FDI liabilities lowered the probability 
of their occurrence. Catão and Milesi-Ferretti (2014) noted that that an increase in net foreign 
assets lowered the probability of the occurrence of external crises. They reported that debt 
liabilities were a significant determinant of these crises, while FDI had the opposite effect, i.e., 
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an increase in FDI liabilities lowered the risk of a crisis. Similarly, Frankel and Wei (2005) 
found that the share of FDI and portfolio equity in gross external liabilities decreased the chance 
of a currency crisis.  
There are also studies that explicitly compare the effect of equity and debt flows. Furceri, 
Guichard and Rusticelli (2012) reported that large capital inflows driven by debt increase the 
probability of banking, currency and balance-of-payment crises, while inflows that are driven by 
FDI or portfolio equity have a negligible effect. Forbes and Warnock (2012) found that episodes 
of extreme capital movements are associated with debt flows, whereas equity flows are not.  
Several recent papers have dealt with the impact of external assets and liabilities in the 
GFC.6 As stated above, Lane (2013) suggested that the “long debt, short equity” external profile 
of the emerging markets “…provided valuable insulation against the crisis. In contrast, the “long 
equity, short debt” profile of many advanced economies was a risky profile in the face of 
declining equity markets and disruption in credit markets.” Gourinchas, Rey and Truempler 
(2012) examined the wealth transfers that took place via changes in external positions during the 
crisis to determine which countries benefitted and which lost.  
Al-Saffar, Ridinger and Whitaker (2013) also looked at external balance sheets during the 
GFC, and found that external debt liabilities contributed to the deviation of GDP in 2009 from its 
1997-2007 trend. They did not find evidence of a linkage from net equity holdings to the 
slowdown in growth, but did not decompose equity into its FDI and portfolio components. Balli, 
Basher and Balli (2013) investigated income factor flows in advanced economies during the 
crisis, and reported that debt provided better risk sharing than equity.  
Llaudes, Salman and Chivakul (2010) examined the record of the crisis in emerging 
market economies. They found that the impact of the crisis was more pronounced in those 
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countries with weaker fundamentals and greater financial and trade linkages. The financial 
variables included foreign bank claims on the emerging market countries. Berkmen et al. (2012) 
also investigated the GFC and the emerging market countries, and reported that financial 
channels were the main channel of transmission, with leverage and short-term debt contributing 
to lower growth. Didier, Hevia and Schmukler (2012) found that more trade and financial 
openness, current account deficits, and higher growth rates of credit contributed to collapses in 
GDP growth in emerging markets. 
Our research, therefore, draws from several strands of the literature, including analyses of 
external capital structures, external adjustment, and the record of the GFC. We build upon this 
work to examine whether the composition of external balance sheets affected economic 
performance during the GFC. We leave for future work an investigation of the determinants of 
the components of the balance sheets. 
 
4. Data 
We obtained data for 67 countries, which included 44 emerging market economies and 23 
advanced economies.7 We did not include small financial centers with oversized financial 
holdings (Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Singapore), countries where oil exports 
were the dominant source of economic activity or those with populations below one million. The 
countries included in the sample are listed in the Appendix. 
The data on external assets and liabilities were taken from the latest version of the 
“External Wealth of Nations” dataset, which was constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2007).8 We use the NIIP scaled by GDP (NIIP/Y), as well as the sum of external assets and 
liabilities scaled by GDP as a measure of de facto financial openness (Fin Open/Y). We also use 
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a country’s net equity position scaled by GDP (Net Eq/Y) and its components, the net FDI 
balance (Net FDI/Y) and the net position in portfolio equity (Net Prt/Y), as well as net debt (Net 
Dbt/Y), and the central bank’s foreign exchange assets scaled by GDP (For Res/Y). In addition 
we use measures of the gross stocks of assets and liabilities, all scaled by GDP: FDI assets (FDI 
Ast/Y) and liabilities (FDI Lbt/Y), portfolio assets (Prt Ast/Y) and liabilities (Prt Lbt/Y), and 
debt assets (Dbt Asset/Y) and liabilities (Dbt Lbt/Y).   
Figure 3 shows the ratio of equity/debt liabilities for the countries in our sample in 2007. 
It confirms that most emerging market economics (the countries with blue bars) had ratios above 
100%, although there are outliers such as Lithuania and Latvia, which borrowed extensively 
from West European banks. Similarly, most advanced economies (red bars) had issued more debt 
than equity, although again there are exceptions, such as Canada.  
Our crisis indicators include GDP growth rates, participation in an IMF program and 
banking crises.9 We provide more detail for each crisis variable as well as the control variables 
used in the empirical analyses in the following sections of results. A list of all the variables and 
their data sources and descriptive statistics appears in the Appendix.  
 
5. Results 
5.1 Growth  
The decline in economic activity during 2008 and 2009 was used by Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2011) in their analysis of the cross-country severity of the crisis, and in several 
subsequent similar studies. We follow them in our specification of the dependent variable, the 
average real growth rate of GDP over the two years, and the choice of control variables. The 
range of values of average GDP growth during the two crisis years is shown in Figure 4, which 
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shows that most emerging market countries had higher growth rates than most advanced 
economies. 
The control variables for the growth regressions include the current account as a 
percentage of GDP (Cur Act/Y); the change in domestic credit during the period of 2004-2007 as 
a percentage of GDP (ΔDom Cr/Y); the logarithm of GDP per capita in 2011 international 
dollars (Y/Pop); and trade openness as measured by exports and imports as a percentage of GDP 
(Trad Open/Y). The current account data were obtained from the “External Wealth of Nations,” 
while the data for the other control variables were taken from World Development Indicators. 
We added the external balance sheet variables listed above. We used the 2007 values of all these 
variables to avoid simultaneity.  
Our results are reported in Table 1. The results for the control variables are quite similar 
to those of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011). The countries with better growth records during the 
crisis were those with higher current account balances, smaller growth in domestic credit in the 
period leading up to the crisis and lower GDP per capita. Trade openness and financial openness 
were not significant, with the possible exception of the results in one of the subsequent equations 
where their coefficients are negative and positive, respectively. The adjusted R2s range from 
0.38-0.46, and these are also similar to those reported by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2011).  
Turning to the external balance sheet variables, a country’s net international investment 
position scaled by GDP appears in the first equation with a negative coefficient that is significant 
at the 5% level. A higher net position in the period before the crisis led to lower growth during 
the crisis. In order to ascertain which assets and liabilities drive this result, in equation 1.2 we 
replace the NIIP with its components: net equity/GDP, net debt/GDP and foreign exchange 
reserves also scaled by GDP. Net equity appears with a highly significant negative coefficient, 
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while net debt and foreign reserves are not significant.10 In equation 1.3, we replace net equity 
with its components, net FDI and net portfolio equity, and drop the other two variables from the 
previous estimation. The coefficient of the net FDI variable is negative and significant at the 1% 
level, whereas the coefficient of the net portfolio variable is negative but not significant.  
We then replace the net equity and net debt positions with their components: FDI assets 
and liabilities in equation 1.4, portfolio assets and liabilities in equation 1.5, and debt assets and 
liabilities in equation 1.6. Only the FDI variables appear to be significant: FDI assets with a 
negative coefficient and FDI liabilities with a positive coefficient, both significant at the 5% 
level. The two findings suggest that the countries that hosted foreign partners did better during 
the crisis than did their partners’ home countries. The portfolio equity variables have the same 
signs as the FDI variables but are not significant. 
Figure 5 plots the countries’ Net FDI positions in 2007 against their average growth in 
2008-09. The advanced economies are concentrated in the right-hand and lower area and the 
emerging markets appear mainly in the left-hand and upper area. Given their positions, it might 
be argued that the net FDI variable is a proxy for something else that distinguishes emerging 
market countries from advanced nations. Our inclusion of GDP per capita in the estimations 
should control for that, but we also estimated the equations using only data from the emerging 
market countries, and Table 2 reports those results.     
The results are consistent with those of the previous table, and the adjusted R2s are 
higher. The current account is not always significant in these regressions, but the negative impact 
of domestic credit and income per capita are. The net equity and net FDI variables appear with 
negative coefficients that are significant at the 5% level. The FDI assets coefficient has a 
negative coefficient that is significant at the 5% level, while the positive impact of FDI liabilities 
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is significant at the 10% level. The results indicate that within this group of emerging market 
countries, there was a range of external balance sheet positions and responses to the crisis that 
are consistent with the hypothesis that countries with a “short equity” position did better than 
those that were not. 
As a further test of robustness, we respecified our dependent variable to be the difference 
between average growth in 2008-09 and the growth rate projected by the IMF in its publication, 
World Economic Outlook, in the October issue of the previous year.11 Those results appear in 
Table 3, and are generally consistent with those of the previous two tables, although the adjusted 
R2s are lower. The negative sign of the change in domestic credit is strongly significant, as is the 
negative sign of trade openness, but the coefficient of the current account is not. Increases in net 
equities and net FDI are associated with slower growth in 2008-09 at the 5% level of 
significance. The positive coefficient of FDI liabilities, which is significant at the 10% level, 
demonstrates that these liabilities provided a buffer against the worst effects of the shock. 
Additional tests of robustness are reported in Section 6. 
Our results for the positive role of FDI liabilities in moderating the effect of external 
shocks are consistent with evidence from microeconomic studies of the GFC.12 Tong and Wei 
(2011) used firm-level data to analyze the impact of capital flows on stock prices during the 
GFC. They reported the 2008-09 “credit crunch” was more severe for emerging economies with 
a higher pre-crisis exposure to foreign portfolio investment and foreign loans, but FDI flows 
alleviated the impact. Similarly, Alfaro and Chen (2012) examined the response of firms to the 
crisis and fund that the sales of multinational subsidiaries fared better than those of domestic 
firms. They attributed the difference in performance to production and financial linkages 
between domestic subsidiaries and their parent firms.  
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Our results confirm that the composition of external assets and liabilities affected the 
response of countries to the GFC. FDI liabilities appear to be particularly important in buffering 
nations from declines in growth due to foreign shocks, while FDI assets had the opposite effect. 
The results are consistent with other analyses of the linkages among nations during the GFC. 
 First, changes in the values of investments that had been financed by foreign funds 
contributed to the transfer of wealth documented by Gourinchas, Rey and Truempler (2012). 
Since most countries report only the book value of their FDI positions, they used equity price 
index changes to estimate the changes in market values of foreign investments. They reported 
that “…most countries long equity or direct investment faced losses on their net positions, as 
risky assets took some of the sharpest valuation falls in the crisis.” The U.S., for example, had an 
overall valuation loss of $2,069 billion when direct investment is measured at market value.  
The counterparts to these losses were the gains in the NIIPs of those countries that had 
issued FDI liabilities. Lane (2013) pointed out these improvements were a “stabilizing force,” 
which differed from the usual pattern observed in previous emerging market crises when debt 
liabilities denominated in a foreign currency were more common on the balance sheets of those 
countries. Similarly, Ceballos et al. (2013) pointed out that the emerging markets were willing to 
allow their currencies to depreciate during the GFC since the decline in currency values 
contributed to the fall in value of their liabilities that were denominated in the local currency. 
The opposite changes occurred in the U.S., which was a net holder of equities and recorded a 
currency appreciation during the GFC.  
In addition, FDI flows were less volatile than other forms of capital flows during the 
crisis. Wei (2011) examined capital flows to 24 emerging economies from 1990 to 2009. He 
found that that all the components of these flows rose in the years leading to the crisis and then 
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were reversed. But international bank loans accounted for the sharpest rise and fall, while FDI 
flows were “comparatively stable.” Globan (2012) also found that countries that relied on foreign 
loans rather than FDI in the pre-crisis period suffered larger capital flow reversals during the 
crisis. This stability benefitted those countries that had obtained external financing through FDI, 
while those that had borrowed through banks had to deal with the repercussions of the reversal of 
bank lending.  
   
5.2 Bank Crises 
Capital outflows have been linked to domestic bank crises, and to investigate whether this 
form of financial instability manifested itself during the GFC, we tested whether the composition 
of the balance sheet affected the probability of a bank crisis. We drew upon past work, including 
the papers cited above, in specifying our model.13 The dependent variable took the value of one 
if a systemic bank crisis was recorded in 2008 or 2009 in Laeven and Valencia’s (2013) crisis 
database.14 There were 20 crises in our sample, and these are noted in the list of countries in the 
Appendix. The control variables include the change in domestic credit from 2004 to 2007, the 
logarithm of GDP per capita and financial openness. We also included the rate of real GDP 
growth (%ΔY) and inflation (%ΔP) in 2007. Since the dependent variable is binary, we used a 
probit estimation. 
The results are presented in Table 4. All the control variables have the expected signs and 
are significant in at least some of the estimations, and the pseudo R2s are relatively high. The 
growth of domestic credit and inflation have positive coefficients significant at the 5% or 10% 
level in all the equations. Higher per capita income and financial openness also contributed to the 
incidence of bank crises.  
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 Countries with larger net holdings of equity were more likely to suffer a bank crisis. 
When we replace the net equity variable with the net FDI and net portfolio equity positions, the 
coefficients of both are significant at the 10% level. We then test the significance of the various 
forms of liabilities. FDI liabilities have a negative coefficient that is significant at the 10% level, 
which explains the negative coefficient on net FDI. Portfolio equity liabilities also have a 
negative coefficient but it is not significant. The coefficient of the debt liability variable has the 
opposite sign, and is significant at the 10% level.  
Countries that issued external debt to finance borrowing, therefore were more likely to 
subsequently experience a banking crisis, while the use of FDI liabilities had the opposite 
impact. Joyce (2011) examined systemic bank crises in a sample of emerging markets, and also 
found that foreign debt liabilities contributed to an increase in the incidence of bank crises, while 
FDI and portfolio equity liabilities had the opposite effect. Ahrend and Goujard (2014) 
confirmed that debt liabilities increase the occurrence of systemic banking crises. 
 
5.3 IMF Programs 
 The IMF played an active role in responding the global crisis, and 13 of the countries in 
our sample entered IMF programs during and after the crisis.15 In this section we examine 
whether the participation by governments in IMF programs was affected by the composition of 
external balance sheets before the crisis. To choose appropriate control variables, we drew upon 
previous studies of IMF lending.16 In addition to the current account, the change in domestic 
credit, GDP per capita, and real growth, we also used government consumption divided by GDP 
(Gov/Y) and a dummy variable for fixed exchange rate regimes (Fix).17 We again used lagged 
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values. The dependent variable has the value of one for the countries with IMF programs, and we 
used a probit estimation. 
 The initial estimations were heavily influenced by the size of Hungary’s FDI assets, 
which were worth 97.8% of its GDP, twenty times larger than the average of the FDI holdings of 
the other IMF program countries. We excluded Hungary from our data set for these estimations, 
and the results are reported in Table 5. Those countries that had current account surpluses in 
2007 were less likely to go to the IMF in 2008-09. The adjusted R2 rises as the components of 
the balance sheet are added to the estimations. 
Countries that were net holders of FDI were more likely to enter a Fund program. When 
we separate out FDI assets and liabilities, the liabilities have a negative coefficient significant at 
the 5% level. These results are consistent with those reported in the previous tables, which found 
that FDI liabilities were linked to higher growth rates and fewer bank crises. Moreover, the two 
debt variables are also significant at the 10% level, debt assets with a negative coefficient and 
debt liabilities with a positive sign. The latter finding corresponds to the result in the last table 
that showed that debt liabilities are associated with more bank crises.   
 The results demonstrate the importance of the composition of the external balance sheet 
in determining who needed IMF assistance. Those countries that were long debt and short FDI 
were less likely to enter an IMF program. Countries that issued debt, on the other hand, were 
more likely to need the IMF’s assistance. 
 
6. Extensions and Robustness 
We extended our estimations and tested them for robustness in several ways.  
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First, we introduced the exchange rate regime variable, FIX, into the estimations for GDP 
growth in Tables 1 – 3. We used the variable and interacted it with each of the gross assets and 
liability measures to see if the existence of a fixed exchange rate regime affected the impact of 
the external balance sheet components on the change in GDP. The significance of the FDI 
variables did not change. The fixed exchange rate variable, however, and the interactive terms 
were not significant in any of the estimations.18 
Next, we introduced regional dummies to see if these affected our results. We used 
variables for East Asia, countries in the Eurozone and those that pegged their currencies to the 
euro, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia, with the specifications 
of Table 1. We also interacted the regional dummy with the balance sheet variables. In only one 
case, the Eurozone countries and those that pegged their currencies to the euro, was there 
evidence of a regional effect. The results appear in Table 6. The interactive variables are those 
that begin with “E*”. We omit the results for the control variables, which are quite similar to 
those in Table 1, and for the last equation, where there was no effect, to conserve space.  
The interactive variable of the euro dummy and net FDI has a positive coefficient that is 
significant at the 10% level. Similarly, in the case of net FDI, the euro dummy has a positive 
coefficient that is significant at the 5% level. The positive coefficients and the size of the 
coefficients indicate that the negative effect of the equity variables is largely offset in the case of 
the Eurozone countries and those that peg to the euro. Finally, the interactive variables have a 
positive sign in the case of FDI assets and a negative sign in the case of FDI liabilities, opposite 
to the signs of those variables themselves and close in absolute value. These results suggest that 
the impact of FDI did not seem to be relevant in the response of these European countries to the 
GFC. This may reflect the lack of exchange rate adjustment among these countries, or the fact 
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that there is a great deal of regional FDI. In addition, the Eurozone dummy variable is negative 
in equation 6.5, which includes the portfolio equity variables. 
We also rescaled our balance sheet variables by total assets and total liabilities. We 
included equity assets and liabilities as a share of total assets and liabilities, respectively (Eq 
Ast/Ast, Eq Lbt/Lbt), and did the same for FDI (FDI Ast/Ast, FDI Lbt/Lbt), portfolio equity (Prt 
Ast/Ast, Prt Lbt/Lbt), and debt (Dbt Ast/Ast, Dbt Lbt/Lbt). We also included the ratios of equity 
to debt assets (Eq Ast/Dbt Ast) and liabilities (Eq Lbt/Dbt Lbt), and the ratios of FDI to debt 
(FDI Ast/Dbt Ast, FDI Lbt/Dbt Lbt).  
The results are sensitive to the inclusion of the income per capita variable in the 
regressions. As Figure 3 shows, the relative amounts of equity and debt usually depend on 
whether a country is an advanced or emerging market economy. Regressions of the composition 
of the balance sheet also show this. For example, regressions of the equity assets (liabilities) as a 
share of all assets (liabilities) on the logarithm of income per capita yield the following results 
(standard errors in parentheses): 
(Eq Ast/Ast) = -143.85*** + 17.12*** (Y/Pop) 
                          (5.04)          (2.55)                       adjusted R2 = 0.40 
 
(Eq Lbt/Lbt) =  126.75*** - 8.20** (Y/Pop) 
                          (26.09)        (2.66)                          adjusted R2 = 0.12 
            
Therefore, we report the results in Table 7 without the income per capita variable. These 
results are consistent with those reported in Table 1. All the equity assets, including both FDI 
and portfolio, lower economic growth rates, while equity and FDI liabilities raise it. There is no 
significant impact linked to debt assets or liabilities. The importance of the composition of the 
balance sheet is robust to this alternative specification. 
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Finally, we tried utilized another estimation method for Tables 4 – 6, replacing the probit 
estimates with logit. There was no change in the levels of significance of the balance sheet 
variables. These results, which are available from the author, are consistent with those that we 
report. 
 
7. International Pecking Orders 
Our results can be used to devise a “pecking order” of the different forms of foreign 
capital by how well they buffer a country during a crisis. FDI ranks first as a crisis buffer, 
followed by portfolio equity, which had similar impacts but was generally insignificant, and then 
debt, which reinforced the effects of the crisis. We can compare this pecking order with those 
advanced by others (see Figure 6). 
The original pecking order theory was advanced by Myers and Majluf (1984), and is 
based on an asymmetry of information about a firm’s conditions. Managers know more about a 
firm’s operations than do potential lenders, who therefore undervalue new equity offerings. The 
managers choose to finance investment first with retained earnings as these funds are cheaper 
than external finance, and then issue debt that is acceptable to lenders because of its contractual 
obligations. When the cost of debt begins to rise as more is offered, they issue equity. 
Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1998) devised a ranking for international capital flows, and 
reasoned that the relevant asymmetry of information is between domestic and foreign investors. 
They presented an analysis of how host governments should tax these forms of finance, and also 
ranked them in terms of public welfare. FDI, which avoids much of the informational 
asymmetries, is first, followed by portfolio debt and then portfolio equity. 
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Reisen and Soto (2001) also compared the properties of different forms of capital inflows 
in order to establish a preferential ranking based on their benefits and risks for capital-importing 
nations. They estimated the impact on growth of different forms of capital flows and used the 
results to determine which inflows most augmented growth. They found that the largest positive 
impact came from portfolio equity flows, followed by FDI. Bank lending, on the other had, was 
negatively associated with growth, except when local banks were sufficiently capitalized, while 
bond flows had no significant impact.  
Daude and Fratzscher (2008) also report pecking orders of international capital flows, 
and they included debt securities and loans separately as well as FDI and portfolio equity. Their 
pecking orders, however, do not list the various investment flows in terms of preference. They 
found that FDI and to some extent loans are more sensitive to information frictions than portfolio 
and debt. On the other hand, portfolio equity and debt are more responsive to differences in 
market development and host country institutional quality. From these results they infer that FDI 
may serve as an indicator of weak institutions.  
Ostry et al. (2010) investigated the impact of capital controls on the severity of the global 
financial crisis, and they ranked capital inflows in terns of their volatility and impact on financial 
fragility. FDI is viewed as the least risky, followed by portfolio equity investment. The various 
forms of debt are more risky, beginning with debt denominated in the domestic currency, 
followed by domestic currency debt that is indexed by the Consumer Price Index. The debt seen 
as most risky is debt denominated in a foreign currency. Their results are similar to those of 
Levchenko and Mauro (2007) and Furceri, Guichard and Rusticelli (2012). 
Our pecking order, therefore, supports that of Ostry et al. (2010). Other criteria provide 
different rankings, and countries may have other goals that determine their rankings of capital 
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flows. But the actual pattern of capital inflows during recent decades indicates that this order is 
the one preferred by many emerging market countries. 
 
8. Conclusions and Extensions 
Our results show that the composition of a country’s external balance had a significant 
impact on how it fared during the global financial crisis, as Lane (2013) and others have claimed. 
Most of the emerging market countries learned the lessons of the crises of the late 1990s/early 
2000s. The “long debt (and foreign reserves), short equity” external profile of many emerging 
markets served as a countercyclical buffer against the impact of the crisis in various ways. Those 
advanced and emerging market economies with the opposite configuration of external assets and 
liabilities fared worse, as this composition had a procyclical impact.  
Our results and those of many studies cited in the literature review distinguish between 
FDI and portfolio equity. More work can be done on the role of FDI in international risk-sharing. 
The volatility of investment may be affected by foreign participation in domestic projects. If FDI 
eases crisis-induced liquidity constraints, then it may smooth income and indirectly 
consumption. 
Another extension of this research would be to investigate the determinants of the 
composition of the external balance sheets of emerging market countries. As noted above, some 
authors link the increased use of equity liabilities to improved institutional quality and greater 
financial development. However, Daude and Fratzscher (2008) found a different linkage between 
FDI and institutional quality. Separating FDI and portfolio equity in empirical analyses may 
reveal other differences in the characteristics associated with their use. 
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A related issue that merits investigation is the role of governments—if any—in managing 
the configuration of foreign funds through the use of capital controls. Lane and Schmukler 
(2007), for example, pointed out that the governments of China and India steered foreign 
investors into equity investments, FDI in the case of China and portfolio equity in India. Such a 
strategy would be consistent with the general improvement in economic policies noted by the 
IMF (2012) and others. 
Montiel and Reinhart (1999) demonstrated that the use of capital controls would not 
change the volume of capital inflows, but could influence their composition. Campion and 
Neumann (2003, 2004) report evidence from Latin America that the use of controls did effect the 
composition of capital inflows. Klein (2012), however, investigated whether governments used 
controls to arrange capital inflows in a manner consistent with the pecking order described by 
Ostry et al. (2010), and found little evidence that controls were used for this purpose. This 
remains an open area of research. 
Finally, the configuration of external assets and liabilities as well as the size of global 
capital flows may be changing. Capital flows from the emerging markets, including FDI and 
bank loans, have risen. China’s outward FDI has increased, for example, while its government 
has relaxed controls on foreign borrowing.19 Over time these patterns will alter the stocks of 
assets and liabilities of emerging markets, and may raise their vulnerability to external shocks. 
These balance sheet changes merit watching.  
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NOTES
 
1 Didier, Hevia and Schmukler (2012) offer an analysis of the economic performance of 
emerging market countries during the crisis. Ceballos et al. (2013) examine the policies that 
contributed to this record.  
2 Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005) pointed out that debt issued by emerging market firms and 
governments to foreign investors was often denominated in a foreign currency, usually the 
dollar, to assuage fears of currency depreciation. Hale, Jones and Spiegel (2014) have shown that 
the share of international bonds issued by firms denominated in their domestic currencies has 
risen over time. But Chui, Fender and Sushko (2014) claim that a significant amount of the 
recent debt of corporations in emerging market nations was issued through their foreign 
subsidiaries in offshore markets and denominated in foreign currencies. 
3 Devereux and Sutherland (2009), Mendoza, Quadrini and Ríos-Rull (2009) and Mendoza and 
Smith (2009) develop theoretical models to explain the difference in the composition of external 
assets and liabilities of the advanced and emerging economies. 
4 Hutchison and Noy (2002, 2005) find output costs of 5-8% of GDP resulting from currency 
crises in emerging markets, which they attribute in part to wealth changes.   
5 Bracke and Schmitz (2011) found that capital gains were more important than investment 
income as a channel of risk-sharing. Habib (2010), on the other hand, has claimed that cumulated 
investment income balances have a stronger influence than valuation changes on net external 
positions over time. See also Schmitz (2010, 2013). 
6 Some studies investigated how holdings of international reserves affected performance during 
the crisis. See Aizenman and Sun (2012), Dominguez, Hashimoto and Ito (2012), and Bussière et 
al. (2015). 
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7 We relied on the October 2007 edition of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook for the 
classification of the economies. 
8 The dataset is available at: http://www.philiplane.org/EWN.html 
9 Frankel and Saravelos (2012) used six indicators of crisis incidence in their study of the 2008-
09 crisis, including the change in GDP and the use of IMF credit.  
10 The studies cited in note #5 and others report different findings regarding the significance of 
foreign reserves during the GFC. The specifications of the variable and the estimating equation 
affect the results. 
11 The World Economic Outlook is published twice a year, in April and October. 
12 Lipsey (2001) examined capital flows and the performance of U.S. affiliated firms during the 
Latin American debt crisis of 1980s, the Mexican crisis of 1994-95, and the Asian crisis of 1997-
98. He found that direct investment inflows into the crisis countries were more stable than other 
types of flows, and that U.S. manufacturing affiliates increased their exports in the wake of the 
crises more quickly than did domestic firms. 
13 Kauko (2014) provides a recent survey of the empirical literature on banking crises. 
14 Laeven and Valencia (2013) define a bank crisis is defined as systemic if there are “significant 
signs of financial distress in the banking system” and “significant banking policy interventions in 
response to significant losses in the banking system.” 
15 We included Greece and Portugal as program countries, as their need for IMF financing was 
clearly related to their pre-crisis borrowing. The programs were all Stand-by Arrangements, 
except for Portugal’s that was arranged as an Extended Fund Facility. We did not include the 
Flexible Credit Line programs as no credit was drawn through these. See Joyce (2012) for an 
account of the IMF’s activities before and during the global financial crisis. 
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16 Sturm, Berger and de Haan (2005) review the economic and political factors that appeared in 
previous studies of the determinants of Fund programs. 
17 The variable takes the value of one if a country’s exchange rate regime ranges between 1 – 8 
on the Reinhart-Rogoff (2004) scale of exchange rate regimes that has a total range of 1 – 13, 
Higher numbers denote more flexible regimes. 
18 Results available from author. 
19 See He et. al (2012) 
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Figure 2 
 
External Balance Sheet 
 
   Assets     Liabilities 
   Equity (FDI, Portfolio)F    Equity (FDI, Portfolio)D 
+ Debt (Bonds, Bank Loans)F + Debt (Bonds, Bank Loans)F/D 
+ Foreign Exchange Reserves F  
 
Foreign Assets of Domestic Residents - Domestic Liabilities of Foreign Residents = 
  
Net International Investment Position (+ creditor, - debtor) 
 
Note: F identifies assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currency, D denominated in 
domestic currency, F/D denominated in foreign or domestic currency. 
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Figure 6 
 
International Pecking Orders 
 
Authors First Second Third 
Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1998) 
 
FDI Portfolio Debt Portfolio Equity 
Reisen and Soto (2001) 
 
Portfolio Equity FDI Debt 
Ostry et al. (2010) FDI Portfolio Equity Debt 
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Table 1 
 
Average GDP Growth (2008-09) and External Assets and Liabilities: Full Sample 
 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) 
Cur Act/Y 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.11** 0.12** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
ΔDm Cr/Y -0.05* -0.04* -0.03 -0.03 -0.05* -0.04* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Y/Pop -3.44*** -2.77*** -2.66*** -2.94*** -3.20*** -3.64*** 
 (0.70) (0.76) (0.75) (0.73) (0.82) (0.74) 
Trad Open/Y -0.01 -0.02 -0.02* -0.02 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Fin Open/Y 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
NIIP/Y -0.03**      
 (0.01)      
Net Eq/Y  -0.06***     
  (0.02)     
Net Dbt/Y  -0.01     
  (0.01)     
For Res/Y  -0.03     
  (0.03)     
Net FDI/Y   -0.07***    
   (0.02)    
Net Prt/Y   -0.04    
   (0.02)    
FDI Ast/Y    -0.07**   
    (0.03)   
FDI Lbt/Y    0.05**   
    (0.02)   
Prt Ast/Y     -0.04  
     (0.04)  
Prt Lbt/Y     0.01  
     (0.03)  
Dbt Ast/Y      -0.02 
      (0.02) 
Dbt Lbt/Y      0.01 
      (0.02) 
Constant 34.23*** 27.93*** 26.92*** 29.75*** 32.47*** 36.32*** 
 (6.63) (7.23) (7.15) (7.00) (7.71) (6.92) 
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.44 0.38 0.38 
N 67 67 67 67 67 67 
 
Note: See text for variable definitions. *,**,*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance 
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Table 2 
 
Average GDP Growth (2008-09) and External Assets and Liabilities:  
Emerging Markets 
 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6) 
Cur Act/Y 0.15* 0.15* 0.18** 0.19** 0.08 0.06 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
ΔDm Cr/Y -0.15** -0.14** -0.14** -0.13** -0.17*** -0.17*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) 
Y/Pop -2.97** -2.58* -2.71** -3.01** -2.86* -3.22** 
 (1.34) (1.30) (1.31) (1.27) (1.44) (1.35) 
Trad Open/Y -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Fin Open/Y 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
NIIP/Y -0.02      
 (0.02)      
Net Eq/Y  -0.07**     
  (0.03)     
Net Dbt/Y  0.02     
  (0.03)     
For Res/Y  -0.03     
  (0.04)     
Net FDI/Y   -0.09**    
   (0.03)    
Net Prt/Y   -0.04    
   (0.04)    
FDI Ast/Y    -0.10**   
    (0.04)   
FDI Lbt/Y    0.07*   
    (0.04)   
Prt Ast/Y     -0.01  
     (0.08)  
Prt Lbt/Y     0.03  
     (0.05)  
Dbt Ast/Y      0.04 
      (0.04) 
DbtLbt/Y      -0.03 
      (0.04) 
Constant 30.34** 26.69** 27.56** 30.17** 29.40** 32.75*** 
 (11.77) (11.50) (11.54) (11.13) (12.63) (11.81) 
Adjusted R2 0.47 0.53 0.54 0.53 0.45 0.46 
N 44 44 44 44 44 44 
 
Note: See text for variable definitions. *,**,*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance 
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Table 3 
 
Difference in Average and Projected GDP Growth (2008-09)   
and External Assets and Liabilities: Full Sample 
 
 (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6) 
Cur Act/Y 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.02 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
ΔDm Cr/Y -0.05** -0.05** -0.04** -0.04* -0.05** -0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Y/Pop -1.60** -1.09 -1.08 -1.34* -1.60** -1.77*** 
 (0.63) (0.70) (0.69) (0.67) (0.73) (0.66) 
Trad Open/Y -0.02** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.02* -0.02** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Fin Open/Y 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01* 0.00 0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
NIIP/Y -0.02*      
 (0.01)      
Net Eq/Y  -0.04**     
  (0.02)     
Net Dbt/Y  -0.01     
  (0.01)     
For Res/Y  -0.02     
  (0.03)     
Net FDI/Y   -0.04**    
   (0.02)    
Net Prt/Y   -0.02    
   (0.02)    
FDI Ast/Y    -0.03   
    (0.03)   
FDI Lbt/Y    0.04*   
    (0.02)   
Prt Ast/Y     -0.01  
     (0.04)  
Prt Lbt/Y     0.01  
     (0.02)  
Dbt Ast/Y      -0.02 
      (0.02) 
Dbt Lbt/Y      0.00 
      (0.02) 
Constant 12.71** 7.87 7.88 10.61 13.03* 14.39** 
 (6.02) (6.64) (6.60) (6.41) (6.93) (6.16) 
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.17 0.19 
N 67 67 67 67 67 67 
 
Note: See text for variable definitions. *,**,*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance 
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Table 4 
 
Bank Crises and External Assets and Liabilities 
 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) 
ΔDom Cr/Y 0.13* 0.16* 0.16** 0.09* 0.05** 0.05* 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) 
Y/Pop 5.25* 5.42* 5.05* 4.52* 4.45 5.27 
 (2.84) (3.14) (2.80) (2.69) (2.78) (3.27) 
%ΔY -0.74 -0.76 -0.42* -0.43* -0.41 -0.27 
 (0.45) (0.50) (0.23) (0.25) (0.27) (0.18) 
%ΔP 0.95** 1.13* 1.04** 0.82** 0.75* 0.88* 
 (0.48) (0.58) (0.50) (0.40) (0.41) (0.48) 
Fin Open/Y 0.01* 0.01* 0.01 0.01** 0.01* -0.01 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
NIIP/Y 0.03*      
 (0.01)      
Net Eq/Y  0.08*     
  (0.05)     
Net Dbt/Y  0.01     
  (0.02)     
For Res/Y  0.06     
  (0.06)     
Net FDI/Y   0.10*    
   (0.06)    
Net Prt/Y   0.08*    
   (0.04)    
FDI Lbt/Y    -0.03*   
    (0.02)   
Prt Lbt/Y     -0.04  
     (0.03)  
Dbt Lbt/Y      0.05* 
      (0.03) 
Constant -57.53* -61.40* -57.80* -50.61* -49.90* -60.40* 
 (29.92) (33.83) (30.73) (28.83) (29.80) (35.65) 
Pseudo R2 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.77 0.76 0.79 
N 64 64 64 64 64 64 
 
Note: See text for variable definitions. *,**,*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance 
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Table 5 
IMF Programs and External Assets and Liabilities 
 
 (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) 
Cur Act/Y -0.10** -0.68 -0.38*** -0.32*** -0.09** -0.07** 
 (0.05) (0.63) (0.14) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) 
ΔDom Cr/Y -0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06* -0.01 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Pop/Y -0.39 -6.30 -1.48 -0.39 -0.48 -0.84 
 (0.53) (6.45) (1.12) (0.79) (0.62) (0.68) 
%ΔP 0.12 0.80 0.24 0.24 0.12 0.26** 
 (0.08) (0.68) (0.18) (0.17) (0.08) (0.12) 
Gov/Y -0.03 -0.30 -0.08 -0.05 -0.03 -0.07 
 (0.07) (0.33) (0.12) (0.13) (0.08) (0.09) 
Fix 0.35 0.55 0.88 0.76 0.28 0.11 
 (0.55) (1.03) (0.88) (0.83) (0.55) (0.64) 
NIIP/Y 0.00      
 (0.01)      
Net Eq/Y  0.08     
  (0.06)     
Net Dbt/Y  -0.05     
  (0.06)     
For Res/Y  -0.41     
  (0.39)     
Net FDI/Y   0.11**    
   (0.04)    
Net Prt/Y   0.06    
   (0.04)    
FDI Ast/Y    0.07   
    (0.05)   
FDI Lbt/Y    -0.10**   
    (0.04)   
Port Ast/Y     0.01  
     (0.03)  
Port Lbt/Y     -0.01  
     (0.02)  
Debt Ast/Y      -0.03* 
      (0.02) 
Debt Lbt/Y      0.04* 
      (0.02) 
Constant 2.27 60.46 13.68 3.20 3.06 5.30 
 (4.91) (62.27) (10.49) (7.15) (5.69) (5.99) 
Pseudo R2 0.36 0.76 0.65 0.63 0.37 0.45 
N 63 63 63 63 63 63 
 
Note: See text for variable definitions. *,**,*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance 
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Table 6 
Average GDP Growth (2008-09) and External Assets and Liabilities with Eurozone 
  
 (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) 
Euro -1.41 -0.96 -0.55 -1.21 -3.45** 
 (1.28) (1.56) (1.18) (1.81) (1.48) 
NIIP/Y -0.04***     
 (0.01)     
E*NIIP/Y 0.03     
 (0.02)     
Net Eq/Y  -0.08***    
  (0.02)    
E*Net Eq/Y  0.06*    
  (0.04)    
Net Dbt/Y  -0.02    
  (0.02)    
E*Net Dbt/Y  0.00    
  (0.03)    
For Res/Y  -0.05    
  (0.04)    
E*For Res/Y  0.03    
  (0.11)    
Net FDI/Y   -0.07***   
   (0.02)   
E*NFDI/Y   0.06**   
   (0.03)   
Net Prt/Y   -0.05   
   (0.03)   
E*Net Prt/Y   0.05   
   (0.05)   
FDI Ast/Y    -0.08***  
    (0.03)  
E*FDI Ast/Y    0.06*  
    (0.03)  
FDI Lbt/Y    0.06**  
    (0.03)  
E*FDI Lbt /Y    -0.06*  
    (0.03)  
Prt Ast/Y     -0.06 
     (0.05) 
E*Prt Ast/Y     0.05 
     (0.07) 
Prt Lbt/Y     0.02 
     (0.03) 
E*Prt Lbt/Y     -0.01 
     (0.06) 
Constant 25.57*** 19.54** 19.29** 21.89*** 22.14** 
 (6.99) (7.47) (7.57) (7.59) (8.66) 
Adjusted R2 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.42 
N 67 67 67 67 67 
 
Note: See text for variable definitions. *,**,*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance 
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Table 7 
 
Average GDP Growth (2008-09) and External Assets and Liabilities:  
Balance Sheet Ratios 
 
 (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6) 
Cur Act/Y 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.20*** 0.19** 0.20*** 0.22*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) 
ΔDom Cr/Y -0.04* -0.04* -0.05** -0.05* -0.06** -0.05* 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Trad Open/Y -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Fin Open/Y 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NIIP/Y -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.04** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Eq Ast/Ast -0.09***      
 (0.02)      
Eq Lbt/Lbt 0.08***      
 (0.03)      
FDI Ast/Ast  -0.10***     
  (0.04)     
FDI Lbt/Lbt  0.06*     
  (0.03)     
Prt Ast/Ast   -0.10**    
   (0.05)    
Prt Lbt/Lbt   0.02    
   (0.04)    
Dbt Ast/Ast    0.03   
    (0.03)   
Dbt Lbt/Lbt    -0.07   
    (0.04)   
Eq Ast/Dbt Ast     -0.01**  
     (0.01)  
Eq Lbt/Dbt Lbt     0.02**  
     (0.01)  
FDI Ast/Dbt Ast      -0.01 
      (0.01) 
FDI Lbt/Dbt Lbt      0.02* 
      (0.01) 
Constant -0.11 1.28 2.70* 4.35** 0.86 1.15 
 (1.74) (1.50) (1.39) (2.03) (1.38) (1.36) 
Adjusted R2 0.37 0.31 0.25 0.22 0.28 0.24 
N 67 67 67 67 67 67 
 
Note: See text for variable definitions. *,**,*** denote 10%, 5% and 1% levels of significance 
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Appendix 
 
 Table A1 
 
List of Countries 
 
  
Advanced Economies 
Australia Greece+,* Slovenia+ 
Austria+ Israel South Korea 
Belgium+ Italy+ Spain+ 
Canada Japan Sweden+ 
Denmark+ Netherlands+ Switzerland+ 
Finland New Zealand United Kingdom+ 
France+ Norway United States+ 
Germany+ Portugal+,*  
 
 
Emerging Economies 
Algeria Estonia Peru 
Azerbaijan Guatemala* Philippines 
Belarus* Hungary+,* Poland 
Brazil India Romania* 
Bulgaria Indonesia Russia+ 
Chile Jordan Slovak Republic 
China Kazakhstan+ South Africa 
Colombia Latvia +,* Sri Lanka* 
Costa Rica* Lebanon Thailand 
Croatia Lithuania Tunisia 
Czech Republic Malaysia Turkey 
Dominican Republic* Mexico Ukraine+,* 
Ecuador Morocco Uruguay 
Egypt Pakistan* Venezuela 
El Salvador* Panama  
 
 
  
 Note: + Bank crisis 2008-09, *IMF program   
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Table A2 
 
Data Sources 
 
Symbol Definition Source 
Cur Acct/Y Current Account/GDP (%) EWN 
 
Dbt Ast/Ast, Dbt Ast/Y 
Dbt Lbt/Lbt, Dbt Lbt/Y 
Debt Assets/Assets, Debt Assets/GDP,  
Debt Liabilities/Liabilities, Debt 
Liabilities/GDP (%) 
 
EWN 
ΔDm Cr/Y Change in Domestic Credit to Private 
Sector/GDP, 2004-2007 (%) 
 
WDI 
Eq Ast/Ast,  
Eq Ast/Dbt Ast,  
Eq Lbt/Lbt,  
Eq Lbt/Dbt Lbt 
Equity Assets/Assets, Equity Assets/Debt 
Assets, Equity Liabilities/Liabilities,  
Equity Liabilities/Debt Liabilities (%) 
 
EWN 
 
FDI Ast/Ast, FDI Ast/Y 
FDI Lbt/Lbt, FDI Lbt/Y 
 
FDI Assets/Assets, FDI Assets/GDP, 
FDI Liabilities/Liabilities, FDI Liabilities/Y 
(%) 
 
 
EWN 
 
FDI Ast/Dbt Ast,  
FDI Lbt/Dbt Lbt 
FDI Assets/Debt Assets, 
FDI Liabilities/Debt Liabilities (%) 
 
EWN 
Fin Open/Y External Assets + Liabilities/GDP (%) EWN 
 
Fix Fixed Exchange Rate Regime = 1 
if Reinhart and Rogoff = 1-8 
Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) 
 
For Res/Y,  
For Res/Imp 
Foreign Reserves/Y,  
Foreign Reserves/ Imports (%) 
 
EWN,  
WDI 
Gov/Y Government Consumption/GDP (%) WDI 
 
Net Dbt/Y, Net Eq/Y,  
Net FDI/Y, Net Prt/Y 
Net Debt/GDP, Net Equity/GDP, Net 
FDI/GDP, Net Portfolio Equity/GDP (%) 
 
EWN 
 
 
NIIP/Y Net International Investment Position/GDP (%) 
 
EWN 
%ΔP Growth Rate of Consumer Price Index (%) WDI 
 
(continued on next page) 
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Table A2 (continued) 
 
Data Sources 
 
 
 
Symbol Definition Source 
Prt Ast/Ast, Prt Ast/Y, 
Prt Lbt/Lbt, Prt Lbt/Y 
Portfolio Equity Assets/Assets, Portfolio Equity 
Assets/GDP, Portfolio Equity Liabilities/ 
Liabilities, Portfolio Liabilities/GDP (%) 
EWN 
   
Trad Open/Y Exports + Imports/GDP (%) 
 
WDI 
%ΔY Growth Rate of Real GDP (%) WDI 
 
Y/Pop Logarithm of GDP Per-capita (2011 
international $) 
WDI 
 
Note: EWN = “External Wealth of Nations”, WDI = World Development Indicators 
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Table A3 
 
Descriptive Statistics: External Balance Variables 
 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std Dev 
Dbt Ast/Ast 46.02 4.83 91.68 10.05 
Dbt Ast/Y 61.75 1.37 403.70 80.082 
Dbt Lbt/Lbt 51.79  22.13 76.01 14.38 
Dbt Lbt/Y 82.88 4.51 370.49 77.59 
Eq Ast/Ast 24.44 0.28 76.21 19.02 
Eq Ast/Dbt Ast 73.57 0.31 349.74 82.63 
Eq Lbt/Dbt Lbt 108.55 10.75 351.81 71.75 
Eq Lbt/Lbt 46.64 6.76 77.87 15.75 
FDI Ast/Ast 15.05 0.00 63.29 12.40 
FDI Ast/Dbt Ast 46.69 0.00 305.63 61.18 
FDI Ast/Y 22.83 0.00 145.23 32.77 
FDI Lbt/Lbt 34.02 3.05 170.46 15.43 
FDI Lbt/Dbt Lbt 77.55 7.64 200.18 52.13 
FDI Lbt/Y 43.58 3.05 170.46 31.06 
Fin Open/Y 270.07 54.92 1252.77 249.74 
For Res/Y 16.22 0.21 81.61 14.81 
Net Debt/Y -21.13 -107.87 111.31 30.53 
Net Eq/Y -24.86 -146.82 35.07 30.93 
Net FDI/Y -20.75 -109.01 60.58 27.91 
Net Prt/Y -4.59 -47.58 52.32 16.43 
NIIP/Y -30.14 -136.87 146.59 47.16 
Prt Ast/Ast 9.39 0.00 39.01 10.10 
Prt Ast/Y 15.58 0.00 113.49 23.46 
Prt Lbt/Lbt 13.07 0.00 52.50 12.59 
Prt Lbt/Y 20.17 0.00 161.06 25.76 
 
Table A4 
 
Descriptive Statistics: Control Variables 
 
Variable Mean Minimum Maximum Std Dev 
Cur Acc/Y -1.67 -27.12 27.26 9.18 
ΔDm Cred/Y 11.41 -77.28 61.14 18.78 
Gov/Y 15.71 7.62 24.33 4.47 
%ΔP 4.73 0.06 16.60 3.56 
Trad Open/Y 84.93 25.21 192.47 36.71 
%ΔY 5.94 0.11 25.05 3.63 
Y/Pop 9.80 8.26 11.08 0.69 
 
